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Enigmas of Italian
Temperament
Mario Perniola

THE PULCINELLA ENIGMA

The recognition of Italy's national identity in the Neapolitan
theatrical character Pulcinella is the culmination of the opinion
that Italy has been for centuries a society of theatre. This conclusion, however, is paradoxical-above
all, because Pulcinella' s
character consists in not having an identity, but in presenting himself in dozens of different and often contradictory roles. But
Pulcinella's ambiguity is not limited to his chameleon-like and
opportunistic
nature. This ambiguity, in fact, makes up his
unique individuality, because there is not one Pulcinella who
transforms himself, but an infinite number of Pulcinellas who at
the same time act in opposite and contradictory ways.
The artist Tiepolo captured this fundamental plurality with
great skill in many drawings and paintings of the late eighteenth
century. In the drawing The Firing Squad, for example, one sees a
large group of Pulcinellas executing another group of Pulcinellas,
while a third group watches the scene from afar. Which of the
three groups is the "real" Pulcinella? This question presupposes
[Translatedfrom the Italian by Aninne Schneider]
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that there is a secret Pulcinella that is more Pulcinella than the
others. According to the tradition of Pulcinella, however, any
secret of his is soon known to everyone! The "Pulcinella-ness" is
entirely and simultaneously present, be it in the role of executioner, the role of victim or even that of spectator .
Pulcinella places in front of us not a secret, but an enigma.
The search for a national identity is destined to frustration until it
aspires to find a content, type, or character: Pulcinella, as Romeo
DeMaio rightly observes, is simultaneously good for all purposes.
His essence is elsewhere, in a temperament [mododi sentire]that is
an a priori condition to the possibility of all his manifestations. It
is this temperament which creates an enigma, because it unites
the opposed dimensions of exteriority and affectivity. Thus the
two aspects that so many foreign travellers between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries have attributed to Italy come
together in the figure of Pulcinella: Italy is both the country of the
dead and the scene of frenetic action. The existence of a movement that does not come from one's inner nature and that cannot
even be considered as anything automatic, effectively constitutes
an enigma that both repels and attracts the modern mentality.
The simplest solution is to attribute this outer liveliness to
nature. The nineteenth-century French poet Charles Nodier, for
example, saw the essence of Pulcinella in homo naturalis, and in a
life force with its infinite variations and contradictions. But this
answer does not capture the essence of being either Italian or
Neapolitan, because Italy has never been a symbol of natural
spontaneity-quite
the opposite, in fact. Italy is the place par
excellenceof cultural mediation, the seat of a multi-millennial tradition constantly present in ruins and monuments, whose continuity is guaranteed by the Catholic church. Furthermore, in the
collective imagination of foreign visitors, Italy remains the country of Machiavelli, of the reason of the State, and of unscrupulous
politics and intrigue. Pulcinella is certainly no noble savage, nor
the personification of naivete: Jung saw in him the figure of the
rogue. Yet even if one might express some reservation about this
judgment, the pretense of knowing how to get around in the
world and knowing its reality better than anyone else is implicit
in the character of Pulcinella.
To illustrate the case of Pulcinella, it is useful to note Hegel's
description of the ancient Egyptians, especially when he discusses
their apparently boundless turmoil, agitation and restlessness, an
appearance, however, that never reaches the level of inner spiritu-
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ality. The tendency to free oneself from every outside restriction
creates a mixture of gaiety, superstition and sensuality, which
lightheartedly pokes fun at everything. Out of all this material in
constant turmoil, however, nothing ever emerges!
ITALIAN CYNICISM:

A

SPECTACLE WITHOUT SOCIEIY

In Discorso sopra lo stato presente dei costumi degli italiani
(1824), Giacomo Leopardi considers the enigma of this mode of
existence [mododi essere]that unites an enormous liveliness and a
no less enormous indifference when he asks himself about the
causes of such a surprising and eccentric affective disposition.
According to Leopardi, Italy is by nature the most lively, sensitive,
and warm of European countries; however, due to historical and
political circumstances that have deadened expectations and
oppressed enthusiasm, the nation has become so dead, indifferent, and cynical as to be unique in Europe.
Leopardi very astutely locates the key to Italian difference
not in a way of thinking that is different from other peoples, but
in a different way of feeling. As far as opinions are concerned,
Italy is at the level of other peoples: it shares with them the decadence of moral principles associated with the advent of modernity. "Morality is completely destroyed," Leopardi writes, "and it
is impossible to believe that it can come back now or ever, or even
to see how it might do so." Nevertheless while in other countries
the place of moral convictions is taken up by public opinion, by
the need of individuals to be respected, and by the existence of a
society aware and able to act in support of its own values, nothing
of the kind happens in Italy. Here, in fact, public opinion has no
real weight in daily life because the good is rarely rewarded and
the bad, rarely censured: an Italian, in fact, is unwilling to sacrifice practically anything to honor and esteem, since "each Italian
is more or less equally honored or dishonored." Leopardi thus
takes up in another form Tiepolo's depiction of society as a crowd
of Pulcinellas.
Leopardi defines Italian temperament as cynical: "Those
who believe the French are the most cynical of all are deceived.
No one beats or even equals the Italians in this." It is worth noting the reference to nature or to a natural condition in the word
cynicism, which is derived from kuon (dog). Leopardi also underlines the outward character of Italian life, in which the pleasures
of civil conversation are absent: in their place are the entertain-
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ments and dissipations of a life wasted in shows and parties.
Every social tie is thus weakened: man is reduced to the solitude,
desperation, and desolation that create "pure, infinite, profound
and overwhelming boredom." On the whole, Leopardi finds Italy
to be the example of a spectacle without society, of superficiality
not animated by the spirit, conversation, or dialectic: he thus
maintains that Italians have habits and practices, but no principles-that is to say, they lack an ethos, or a collective morality.
All things considered, Leopardi' s criticism is founded on a
spiritualistic presupposition: he takes for granted the inefficacy of
individual moral sentiment in modern times, but believes that
there has to be a collective spirituality, a common sentiment that
takes its place. In this way, the enigmatic character of Italian temperament-which
once again is judged and condemned by foreign standards-escapes
even Leopardi. The specificity of a
feeling without subject, of anonymous affectivity, and of impersonal emotionalism, that constitutes the core of Italian experience
still remains unconsidered: man's twofold metamorphosis into a
thing and of the thing into a sentient being is hastily resolved
with recourse to the notion of cynicism.
In reality, Italian temperament does not consist in simply
stripping one's behavior of every relation with emotion and considering it in its blatant nudity. On the contrary, the idea of truth
as essentially nude is contrary to the baroque idea, so deep-rooted
in Italy, of truth as something essentially clothed.
Under the first layer of clothing there is another layer, and
under that, skin, which is also tissue. At the moment in which
men become statues, mannequins, and puppets, their sensitivity
transfers to the outside, the environment, or the landscape, of
which they themselves are still an integral part: the Italian enigma
consists in the fact that man is gifted with an outer emotionality,
which does not pertain to him intimately, but in which he
nonetheless participates. The actors and the audience take part in
the scene just as do the stage wings and backdrop: if the scene is
permeated with emotion, they, too, are imbued with it. To the foreign eye in search of inner nature, the individual, or a subject, the
actors and the audience seem just so many Pulcinellas, or examples of extreme cynicism: but this consideration too drastically
isolates the individual from the environment and from the surrounding world, that covers and protects him like clothing.
The pretense of extracting an individual identity from such a
mobile and magma-like context can lead to an overly biased and
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negative evaluation of the Italian mode of existence. Leopardi, for
example, maintains that at the base of Italian cynicism there is a
total self-contempt, a profound and deep-rooted lack of self esteem. This is the source of the tendency to offend those present,
leaving them as dissatisfied as possible with themselves and with
their interlocutor. Perhaps the Italian neither particularly esteems
nor despises himself; but he is in a constant state of suspension,
ready to do exactly the opposite of what is expected, for fear of
overly categorical determinations.
He works constantly on the
correction of his own image by means of a process of feedback, a
mechanism of self-regulation that holds him in harmony with his
environment.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Wilhelm von Humboldt captured this intermediate, barely perceptible dimension of Italian life when he defined the Italian emotive tonality as a continual movement between melancholy and
joy, and as a boundary between life and death that allows one to
move more easily through life and resign oneself more easily to
death. Within Italian culture, others have explored the connection
between liveliness and exteriority in a way that is neither caricatured nor biased, but serious and positive. Specifically, I would
like to pause to consider two writers from the early twentieth century: the Neapolitan Antonio Sarno, who developed his ideas
around
the notion of sense, and the Gorizian
Carlo
Michelstaedter, in whose work the notion of persuasion occupies
a key place.
THE ANTI-PULCJNELLA: HISTORICAL $[NS£ IN ANTONIO SARNO

If Pulcinella is known to everyone, Antonio Sarno is known
to very few. Born in Naples in 1887, he committed suicide in
1932. His writings were published posthumously in 1943 in
Pensiero e Poesia, and republished in 1956 with the addition of
more writings under the title Filosofiapoetica.
In the elaboration of his ideas Sarno draws on the work of
Campanella, Bruno and Vico. His point of departure is the opposition between an internal feeling [sensus sui], that is essentially
identical to oneself, and an external feeling that transforms itself
into the things of which it has experience, and that wholly lends
and sacrifices itself, to the end that they live in it. This external
sense is of a passionate nature, in the literal sense of the word,
because the passions make the spirit learn new things, and by
themselves, they change it into something else: thus this sense
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seems to Samo to be a condition of consciousness, which can be
defined as "making or making-into things" ["un farsi or un infarsi
le case"], that is to say, changing into them. Samo writes that the
honor and integrity of consciousness consist in not involving oneself even minimally in the becoming of things, but in listening to
them and letting them run their course by themselves. This presupposes a sort of ascesis , a gnosiological catharsis, making oneself nothing and no one, the death of oneself in order to accept
that which com es from the outside: "one who wants to know
makes a huge void in his spirit, in order to accept the thing," to
understand it, to speak it. In this way, having dispensed with
every pretense to identity and individuality, the conscience
becomes a sort of "magic circle" that attracts things and takes on
their movement. A loving immersion into things, letting them act
and resound, seems to Samo the conditions of a feeling that is
swirling and filled with liveliness.
This is, however, not an appropriation, or an assimilation, of
what is outside, nor an empathic process that projects onto things
the sentiments of the subject. Just as it is impossible to see the
clarity of the sky through a soot-covered window, there can be no
knowledge, if the spirit is all "impure and grimy." A drastic experience of estrangement is essential: Samo repeatedly invites the
reader to accept the extraneousness of that which makes an
impression on the senses, to welcome things specifically for their
strangeness, difference, otherness, and irr educibility to subjectivity. What reaches us is "new, immediate, unmotivated, and dramatic, and it inevitably arouses a sense of wonder."
The experi ence outlined here, however, has nothing to do
with mysticism. While mysticism presupposes a unity betw een
the human and the divine, Sarno's "sense," on the contrary, excludes any rapport of intimacy or confidence with that which
reaches and meets us: the void, the nothing we have mad e in ourselves to accept the other, is not filled by its arrival. This feeling is
enigmatic because it implies an indefinite continuance of attention
and vigilance: this is not rapture, ecstasy, or departure with a new
arrival, but remaining to listen with rapt attention to what happens. As Samo writes about Bruno's philosophy, "Enthusiasm,
not ecstasy, is conceivable, unending conversation, not the suppression of every impulse." This is exactly the opposite of the
Pulcinella' s perpetual motion: "Men place no value on their intentions, but only on their actions. Good intentions do not exculpate
bad actions and bad intentions do not undermine good actions."
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The temperament [sentire]introduced by Sarno is oriented
towards action, the concrete, and pragmatic effectuality: it is thus
the antithesis of Kantian rigor, which he reproaches for being the
most absurd and dangerous ethic ever conceived, precisely for its
utopian orientation that "denies love the right to go where desire
calls it." Man's becoming a thing has its point of reference in the
historical process: making oneself a thing is the production of history. Adhering to things does not mean being submerged by the
indefinite plurality of possibility, indiscriminately taking everything, but rather rejecting the abstract possibility "in favor of the
one alone that is realized." Sarno is thus against the philosophy
of values precisely because of its abstract character, without content, that either excludes all or welcomes all. Sarno's thought
thus finishes by being enveloped in a "destinal halo": "being able
to die is an indispensable factor to history." Furthermore, "drawing away from life is a never-ending process. Even the dead make
progress in death, moving to an ever more profound death."
Between life and death, memory and forgetfulness, success and
failure, there remains a middle, barely perceptible space, that of
the hidden historical situations suspended. This virtuality is culture's great gift: being able from a huge distance of years to take
up again and wake again as much as one has solicited welcome
and development.
Thus the place par excellence of the Italian enigma is not
nature, but history. Its enigma is inexhaustible, because nothing is
ever definitive and identical to itself. "The possibility of all things
to be different than what they are dictates that they are restless
and moving," but this seething of possibility is not a worm's nest;
on the contrary, it allows for the experience of difference, of illimitation, and of the unpredictability of history. It is not we who are
masters of historical knowledge; rather, towards it we remain in a
rapport of extraneity even inasmuch as concerns our existence:
Sarno writes, "The hope from which we spring was from other
hearts, and what we do until death, the very sense of our entire
lives, will be the fleeting memory, or the problematic possession,
of other souls."
ANTI-CYNICISM:

PERSUASION

IN CARLO MICHELSTAEDTER

An equally extreme experience of feeling "on the outside" is
that of Carlo Michelstaedter, who was also born in 1887 and committed suicide in 1910. He wrote La persuasionee la rettorica,pub-

DIFFERENT/A

26

lished posthumously in 1913.
If the cause of cynicism, as Leopardi maintains, is self-disdain, it is within oneself that one must search for the remedy.
This rapport with the self cannot be one of intimacy and abandon,
of a natural and spontaneous identity with one's own life force.
In fact, according to Michelstaedter, a feeling that permits us to go
with the flow of our desires , illusions, hopes, and the spontaneous
course of life, cannot create in us any self-esteem. Michelstaedter
defines mere love of natural life with the Greek word filopsuchfa-synonym of cowardice! Cowardice is, in fact, letting oneself be dragged in a never-ending search for something new,
never being content with the present, experiencing the present as
a non-existent moment between memory and anticipation.
Cowardice is surrendering to this continual deficiency for which
each thing lives and dies every minute. Cowardice is suffering
one's need to live; it is contenting oneself with a chronic deficiency that can never be healed. From this perspective, life is similar
to a weight hanging from a hook: it always tends toward the lowest point , and it never succeeds in halting at a point of perfection.
The eye never tires: it chases first this flash of light, immediately
swallowed by the dark, then that flash, and another, until some
obstacle makes this sad game come to an end . Cowardice is the
life pain that cannot be appeased. The hedonistic conception of
life, in which the important thing is pleasure, is prey to an insatiable hunger that brings ruin and collapse to anyone who relies
on it. In short, filopsuchfais the moral disposition of Pulcinella. It
is not mere coincidence that he is always hungry: "I am so much
in love that I'm dying of hunger " [ "Io songo tanto 'nnamurato ca me
mor'e famme"].
Nevertheless simple love of life is not enough to create the
false consciousness in which cynicism is rooted. There is another
much more despicable moral disposition that Michelstaedter calls
by the name of rhetoric. While cowardice is, so to say, spontaneous, rhetoric is a reactive formation: it consists in the pretense
of claiming an absolute assurance to oppose to the experience of
nothing. It could be considered as a decline of cynicism: in fact,
while a cynical man shows himself in a certain measure for what
he is, the rhetorical man is essentially concealment, mystification ,
and deception. Social life becomes a "gang of thugs," a place
where long-winded flattery tries to hide the complete absence of a
destined experience. Rhetoric is also the denial of historical sense,
because it pretends to abolish time and promises entrance into an
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absolute, eternal dimension. If Pulcinella is cowardly, the man of
rhetoric is doubly so, because he is ashamed of his cowardice and
his mask of feigned courage. If life force is an illusion, rhetoric is
illusion squared. The spirit of a fakir hides in the man of rhetoric:
in him we find an unfounded pretext of stability, an inadequate
affirmation, and under it all, the very fragile aspects of identity,
individuality and certainty. For Michelstaedter there are many
kinds of rhetoric: that of authority, that of the pleasures, an artistic
one, and a philosophical one ... but all go back to the will to
transform the present into something eternal. There is even a
rhetoric of suicide, understood as a need for rest, self-pity.
In opposition to cowardice and rhetoric, Michelstaedter proposes a feeling that he defines with the word "persuasion," whose
essential characteristic is an enigmatic convergence of liveliness
and exteriority, of energy and peace, of life and death, of movement and immobility. Persuasion is intimately connected to selfesteem: But how can one have self-esteem, if he doesn't recognize
himself as subject, as sole originator of his own powers?
Michelstaedter does not believe in a unity of consciousness, nor in
a continuity of internal experience. To escape the insatiable
hunger for life, one must finish with the never-ending yearning
for the future and instead consider each instant of time as already
complete and perfect: "every one of us at every moment in life,
finds himself where it is no longer the moment to linger, but the
culmination of the work." He thus introduces an enigmatic mode
of feeling in which, on the one hand, the situation asserts a compelling and radical extraneousness from which it is impossible to
escape, and, on the other, it creates not passive resignation, but a
strongly emotional and affective state that aspires to complete
autonomy and self-sufficiency. In one respect, it is not necessary
to request that which cannot be given, yet it is precisely this
descent into the abyss of one's own insufficiency that generates a
spirited sense of freedom that Michelstaedter defines as "becoming flame."
What exactly do "persuasion" and "persuade" mean? The
common meaning of these words would lead us off track. For
Michelstaedter it is not at all a matter of convincing someone to
do or believe something. To understand the sense in which he
uses these words, we must look back in time to consider the
ancient meanings.
In Greek, persuade, or convince, is peftho. Originally the root
peith- was only intransitive: it did not mean to convince someone,
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but to have trust, or to trust someone. The transitive use of the
verb does not belong to the ancient Greek and represents a later
change.
The fundamental meaning of persuasion is trust. To be persuaded thus means having a great trust, to be or remain in a state
of trust. The word and the experience to which it pertains are
developed from the Hebrew: in the Greek tradition of the
Seventy-the
Alexandrian translators of the Old Testament in
Greek-the root peith- is a translation of the Hebrew root bth- that
is frequently used in the sapiential books of the Old Testament to
indicate the frame of mind of a just man. Trust is something fundamentally different from faith [p(stis],which is an idea from the
New Testament. Faith implies a deferment to the future, waiting
for salvation to come, in a word, it implies hope; trust, on the
other hand, is something already given, something present, the
state of one who feels safe because he can rely on a solid reality.
"The man who goes safely, cannot go wrong," Michelstaedter
writes. A just man will never be shaken," says the Bible.
But what protects the man who is safe? The answer is simple: fear of death. To live without persuasion means fearing
death . "The dull aching pain that seeps under everything" has its
origins in fear of death. It establishes and nourishes itself on an
experience of time that privileges the future over the present. The
person who lives on hope and waiting necessarily fears death.
The experience of a life that is never satisfied, contented, or fulfilled by the present, that is always longing for something to happen, is condemned to setback and failure.
Persuasion thus identifies itself with the conquest of the present: it means having one's own life in oneself, not waiting to find
the meaning of life in the future, and putting an end to the sad
game that keeps pushing us forward.
Fear of death, for Michelstaedter, is responsible for a whole
series of apparently unrelated experiences. Remorse, for example,
is not regret for past action, but terror that one's life was
destroyed in the irrecoverable past; one is alive, but impotent, in
the face of the future . Another example is anger, which is no
more than impotence to affect something already finished. He
who is persuaded does not ask for life and therefore does not fear
death, but "exists in the immediate moment of health." It belongs
to the person who, in the middle of things, "exists" and lets thirst,
need, and hunger for the future flow away, far from him.
11
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Persuasion is the conquest of the present: it is living free and
strong, an accord between "becoming flame" and "becoming
stone." Hence nothing merely subjective or vitalist intrudes in
this mode of feeling, that has something of what Ernst Bloch
defines as "wanting to become Egyptian like stone." In effect, further exploration of the notion of persuasion as trust carries us to
the Egyptian concept of Maat, which is usually translated as justice, but which can also mean truth, trust, faithfulness, or stability.
As the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann has shown, Maat-differently from Hebrew trust, which always implies a relation with
God-refers to nothing other than oneself. In Israel, Assmann
writes, the just man will justify himself by his trust in God; in
Egypt, the just man will justify himself by his own reliability. In
ancient Egyptian thought, Maat is never man's trust in God, but
the trust the man himself merits due to his solidarity with others
and his own soundness. These considerations allow us to understand more deeply certain of Michelstaedter's
comments in
Dialogo della salute, in which he underlines the connection
between persuasion and justice: "If I am to continue, my life must
be life to others; 'I' must be just to everything, and towards no one
be unjust."
Thus Michelstaedter's persuasion reconsiders in new and
very original terms the Italian enigma, the co-presence and simultaneity of liveliness and exteriority: "becoming stone" and
"becoming flame" are realized in "becoming sword." Persuasion
is not only perfection and trust, but also fearlessness: "The port is
the fury of the sea,/ and the fury of the strongest storm/ when
death laughs freely/ at he who freely challenged it." According
to Michelstaedter, it is necessary "to confront and engage life in
the immediate present"; persuasion has a strategic dimension:
"the strong man has at each point destroyed the bridges for
retreat and left open only that one where he must win or die."
Thus the enigma of Italian feeling manifests itself in its purest
form in a truly Italian virtue that is exactly the opposite of cynicism: contempt, which is an admirable synthesis of sensitivity and
coldness.
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